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Introduction:
Undoubtedly, if you are reading this article, your life has
been affected dramatically by inventions. You may be reading this
on the printed page, thereby owing much of your enjoyment to the
printing press. You could also be reading this from the screen of a
computer, an invention that has more recently had a tremendous
impact on the world. If you are sitting under an artificial light, in a
chair, or just about anywhere, the inventive spirit of others has had
an impact on your life. In fact, almost every aspect of our lives has
been altered by inventions. For that reason, the importance of
inventions and the inventive spirit is hard to deny, and the value to
people is easy to understand.
The significance and importance of inventions are so great
that the Constitution of the United States offers protections for the
interests of inventors. Essentially, it gives Congress the power to2
grant inventors exclusive rights to their inventions. During this
time of exclusivity, the inventor can reap the appropriate
commercial, reputational, or personal benefits that come from his
invention. This protection is also significant, not because the
inventor has rights to his invention, but because his rights are
exclusive and allow him to forbid others to use, make, offer to sell,
or sell the invention. This protection is the basis for today's patent
laws in the United States.
Patent laws offer inventors the right to "exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention" or
process; this protection extends for a period of 20 years.3 In
2 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 (giving Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
3 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2001).
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exchange for this veritable monopoly, the patentee must file an
application for the patent with the U.S. Patent Office. This
application must include a description of the invention or process
with such detail that one skilled in the particular art would be able
to duplicate the invention or process. As of November 29, 2000,
this information will be published eighteen months from the
effective filing date of the application, even if it has not yet been
approved.4
Patent laws exist to protect inventors from such would-be
"idea thieves." However, the right to exclude others from making
or using a patented item certainly must have its limitations. After
all, certainly some unlicensed use by others is expected if the
patentee is required to describe his invention in such great detail.
Otherwise, one could argue that a description should just
accompany the license to use the invention. It is likely that other
parties may wish to simply use the invention for various reasons of
their own that may not include harming the patentee's rights. For
example, other parties may want to assess the usefulness of the
patented product to see if it would fit their needs or even use it for
academic research.
Other parties may also want to use the invention to improve
commercial processes in which they are engaged. Arguably,
processes that would improve technology or lead to more
productive use of the invention, and not do so at the expense of the
patentee's rights, should not be considered infiinging. In fact,
many would suggest that most inventions are the result of previous
inventions. In the words of Ralph Waldo Emerson, "[o]nly an
4 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2001). See generally 35 U.S.C. § 122 (b)(2)(A)(i)
(2001).
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inventor knows how to borrow, and every man is or should be an
inventor."
5
Courts have in fact found that some unlicensed uses of
patented devices are not infringing. One doctrine that allows such
a use to be reached is the experimental use exception. The
"experimental use exception" actually describes two entirely
separate legal doctrines: (1) an exception to the public use bar; and
(2) a defense to unlicensed use of a patented item. The former will
be discussed only briefly. The main focus of this paper is an
analysis of the experimental use exception as a defense to
unlicensed use of a patented item.
Experimental Use Exception as a Defense to the Public Use Bar
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), an invention may not be
patented if it was in public or sale use in the United States more
than one year prior to the date of application for the patent. This
bar prevents the inventor from enjoying exclusive control over his
invention for more than the statutorily permissible time6 and is
commonly known as "the public use bar." Other public policy
justifications for the public use bar are that: (1) it protects the
public if the public had begun using the device prior to application
for the patent; and (2) it encourages disclosure of new and useful
information.7
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), U.S. philosopher, poet, essayist, in JASON
SHuLMAN & ISAAC AsIMov, ISAAC AsIMov's BOOK OF SCIENCE AND NATURE
QUOTATIONS (1988).
6 See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
7 T.P. Labs. v. Prof'I Positioners, 724 F.2d 965 (1984).
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A defense to the public use bar exists if the defendant can
show that his "public use" of the invention was for the purpose of
research and development of the item, not for "commercial
exploitation" of the product.8 Notice that this defense is actually
raised when claims are rejected during application prosecution or
by the patentor when the infringing user claims that the patent is
invalid because of a violation of the public use bar.
This application of the experimental use exception has
often been described in case law. For example, in one case, a
dentist had designed an orthodontic device to use on patients, and
the dentist gave the device to three patients free of charge. His
later-acquired patent was challenged on grounds that this use
violated the public use bar. The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit found that the use of the device did not violate the public
use bar because there was not even the slightest degree of
commercial exploitation prior to filing the patent application. The
court noted that since there was no commercial exploitation, the
patent term was not extended beyond the statutorily permissible
time by the patentee's actions.9
Experimental Use Exception as a Defense to Patent
Infringement
Birth of the Experimental Use Exception
Even before the turn of the Twentieth Century, courts
recognized that some unlicensed uses of patented items should be
permissible. In 1883, Justice Joseph Story first described and
81d. at 973.
91d.
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applied what has become the modem common law experimental
use exception. In Whittemore v. Cutter, the plaintiff accused the
defendant of infringing the patent assigned on a machine used to
produce playing cards. 10 Justice Story's comments in that case are
considered to be the birth of the experimental use exception. He
said that the legislature could not have intended to punish those
who undertook "philosophical experiments" with protected
items.'1
In the case of Sawin v. Guild,12 Justice Story further
described that exceptions to infringement could exist and he began
to set out the boundaries of these exceptions. In this case, plaintiff
brought an action against a deputy sheriff who had seized a
machine to settle a debt. The machine was patented, and the
plaintiff charged that he, as the patent holder, had the exclusive
right to sell the machine. In the Court's decision, Justice Story
looked back to Whittemore and noted that for the making of a
patented machine to be infringing, it must "be the making with an
intent to use for profit, and not for the mere purpose of
philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness
of the specification." He continued to say, "[t]he making must be
with an intent to infringe the patent-right, and deprive the owner of
the lawful rewards of his discovery." He applied this same
reasoning to whether the selling of a patented article is infringing:
"It must be a tortious sale, not for the purpose merely of depriving
the owner of the materials, but of the use and benefit of his
10 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1883).
"I d. at 1121.
12 Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
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patent."' 3 The sheriff's sale of the machine did not meet this
standard for infringement. 1
4
Justice Story's comments show that an exception to
infringement should exist only when the rights of the patent holder
are not being harmed. One of the major factors in determining
whether the patentee is harmed is whether the alleged-infringer
derives a profit from the patented article.
That said, however, Congress has taken this legal theory
further and codified a narrow portion of the experimental use
exception that does allow the use of a patented article, even if its
use is with an eye to future profit.
15
Maturation of the Experimental Use Exception
Common Law:
This article has described the origin of the common law
experimental use exception and noted that it addresses the degree
to which a non-licensed user of a patented item can use the item
without being liable for patent infiingement. Though the common
law experimental use exception is not the most common item for
judicial review, case law does exist to describe some of its
boundaries.
1. Cases In which the Exception Failed
An example in which the exception failed involved a
defendant who used plaintiff's patented culture media to further his
13 id.
14id.
,5 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2001).
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own experiments, which were designed to develop transgenic
cattle. Defendant, however, intended to use this resulting
transgenic animal directly for commercial purposes. In
recognizing that these experiments were done with an eye toward
commercial exploitation, the United States District Court of
Wisconsin said that no common law research experimentation
exception was available and that the use of the media was
infringing.16 The court noted that the experiments were not
"philosophical" nor were they "carried out merely to satisfy the
curiosity of researchers...." Rather, the court said that the use was
part of "ongoing business activities of the defendant."
17
Another case involved using a machine similar to a
patented one for processing furs. The defendant claimed that he
was using the machine to see if he could make some improvement
on it. However, the defendant conducted his experiments by using
the furs that his customers brought him for processing. The court
found that he was infringing the patent on the machine because he
was using it in the ordinary course of business.
18
These cases suggest that the focus of the use cannot be for
commercial advancement if the use is to be seen as experimental. 19
16 See Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technologies, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967
(W.D. Wis. 1999).
17 id.
18 Cimotti Unharing Co. v. Derboklow, 87 F. 997 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1898). See
also Northill Co. v. Danforth, 51 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Cal. 1942) (noting that use
of a patented article was not experimental because it was "in connection with
[the user's] business").
19 See Douglas v. United States, 181 U.S.P.Q. 170 (1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 364
(1975) (noting that the experimental use exception has never been allowed
where "there was a pattern of systematic exploitation, extending over a
prolonged period"). See also Baxter Diagnostics, Inc. v. AVL Scientific Corp.,
798 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that the experimental use exception
[VOL. 3
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Even a use for the purpose of testing will be infringing if it also
will have a proximate commercial purpose.
2. Cases In Which the Exception Was Successfully
Applied
The common law experimental use exception has been used
successfully subsequent to Whittemore and Sawin. Those cases in
which the exception has been successful suggest that using a
product strictly for assessing its applicability to a commercial
process is not an infringing activity. In.Akro Agate Co. v. Master
Marble Co.,20 the defendants used the plaintiff's patented marble-
making machine to assess its applicability to their business. They
later abandoned the machine and adopted a machine that did not
follow the same process as the plaintiff s machine. The court
noted that the defendant's use of a patented machine was not
infringement because it was merely to assess its usefulness and that
it was later abandoned voluntarily.21
In another case, Chesterfield v. United States,22 the
plaintiff, Chesterfield, filed an action against the United States for
infringing a patent describing an invention used to produce
improved cutting-tools. Although the Court found the patents
themselves were invalid, it pointed out that the defendant's use
would not have been infringing even if that were not the case.
does not protect experiments or tests which have a commercial purpose);
Derboklow, 87 F. at 997 (1898) (finding that defendant's use of a patented
article was in the "ordinary course of business" and, therefore, its use was not
experimental).20 Akro Agate Co. v Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305 (N.D.W.V. 1937).
21 id.
2 Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
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They said that the defendant did not manufacture or sell any of the
patented articles; therefore, the use by the defendant was
experimental.
The case law distinguishes the use of a patented product for
commercialization and the use of a patented product to assess its
applicability to a commercial process. Although it may lead to
certain commercially viable results, the latter seems not to be
regarded as infringing.
Codification of the Experimental Use Exception:35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1) 21
In addition to the common law, there is a statutory
exception to experimental use which entitles those who use a
patented product for certain specific purposes to have their use
regarded as non-infringing. This exception was born to protect
drug manufacturers whose use of products was necessary to satisfy
2335 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2001):
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United
States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or
veterinary biological product (as those terms are described in
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of March 4, 1913)
which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA,
recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes
involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely
for uses reasonably related to the development and submission
of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological
products.
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extensive pre-market testing requirements by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).24
This statute came into being as a response to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Roche v. Bolar.25 In Roche, the drug company
Bolar, which manufactured generic drugs, needed to meet FDA
testing requirements of a new generic drug it was producing.
However, the testing of the generic drug, which was necessary to
comply with FDA regulations, required Bolar to use certain items
protected by patents held by Roche. Bolar began this testing with
the intention of shortening the time needed before the drug could
be introduced to the market. The Federal Circuit found that since
the infringing activities were performed for business reasons and
not for curiosity, Bolar's use infringed Roche's patent.26
Congress noted that when an item is used to satisfy
extensive pre-market testing requirements, such as Bolar's, there
are no adverse economic effects on the patent holders by allowing
such use to occur. In fact, it noted that forbidding others to
conduct experiments until after the patent expires effectively
extends the patent holder's period of "commercial exclusivity. 27
This simply serves to extend the patent privileges beyond those
given by the patent.28 Congress questioned whether such extension
was appropriate for a product that offered benefits to mankind such
as those offered by medicine. Recognizing the need to make an
24 See Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 496 U.S. 661, 670 (1990).
25 Roche Products v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
26 Id. at 863.
27 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, H.R. 98-857, 98th
Cong. § 857(I)(1984).
28 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2001) (gives patent protection for 20 years from the
date of application).
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allowance for such use, Congress enacted the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act2 9 in 1984.
The provisions under § 202 of the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act, later codified as 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(), 30 provide an exception to patent infringement for uses
of drugs that are reasonably related to providing information
needed, "under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs."'
After the decision of the Court in Roche, drug companies
began to lobby Congress for a change in laws governing the use of
a patented article for pre-market testing required by the FDA.
Congress responded by codifying § 202 of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act into 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1). 32
The wording of § 271(e)(1) says that the patented product
should be "used solely for purposes reasonably related to testing
requirements under federal law. 33 Case law provides a better
understanding of the limits of this statute. Intermedics describes
the parameters of § 271(e)(1). The court establishes a boundary
for what acts Congress intended to be covered by the statute. It
first points out that it is unlikely that Congress intended the
wording, "uses reasonably related" to include all uses of the
29 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, H.R. 98-857, 98th
Cong. (1984).
30 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990). See also 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2001).
31 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2001).
32 See Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (N.D. Cal.
1991), af#'d, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
33 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2001).
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patented article.34 In other words, when looking to whether the use
of a patented article is covered by § 271(e)(1), one must simply
decide whether these actual uses are "'reasonably related to the
development and submission of information' to the FDA." The
court continued and said that § 271(e)(1) will not apply for any use
that is more than de minimis and that is not reasonably related to
producing data for the FDA.35 Further, the court pointed out that it
would not make sense to forbid § 271(e)(1) coverage for a firm
which performed any actions associated with testing that could
also be in their business interest and, therefore, arguably not solely
for the purposes of FDA testing. After all, the firm is performing
the tests to ensure that the product can be safely sold to the public.
The court stressed, however, that actions that may have a
secondary purpose will not be covered by § 271(e)(1). It does not,
however, preclude other actions, done solely for FDA testing, from
being exempted under the statute. In short, when deciding which
acts should be analyzed under the "solely related" language, courts
will not look to all uses of the patented article, which would
describe a subjective test. Instead, courts will use an objective test
and look only to the acts that would be deemed infringing, but-for
§ 271(e)(1).36
In Roche, the court held that Bolar's use was infringing
despite the fact that it was "limited" to "testing and investigation
strictly related to FDA drug approval. 37 Since § 271(e)(1)
34 Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1285.351 Id. at 1278.36 See id. at 1280.
37 Roche Products v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The acts
described here are now permitted under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Nevertheless,
this description still serves to describe what use would be deemed
"experimental."
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addresses this particular type of use, and it is designed to permit
the use that was found infringing in Roche, these words give a
good indication as to the "use" the statute views as non-infringing.
Although Roche was overruled by § 271(e)(1), it provides
insight into what is considered "experimental" for the purposes of
the statute. In Roche, the court noted that infringement of a patent
cannot be allowed under the "guise of 'scientific inquiry' when
that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial
commercial purposes., 38 This seems to suggest that a use is
deemed infringing unless it can be shown that the use fits into a
carve-out that does not have "definite, cognizable, and not
insubstantial commercial purposes." This understanding of
commercial purposes seems to be similar to that which is described
by the common law.39
In 1990, the Supreme Court referenced the statutory
provision in Eli Lilly v. Medtronic.40 In Eli Lilly, the Court not
only acknowledged the statute's application to pharmaceuticals,
but also extended it to protect medical devices in an effort to
compliment the patent term extensions under 35 U.S.C. § 156.41
These extensions serve to protect not only drugs but also medical
devices and food additives that are subject to the FDCA
regulations.42
Since § 271 (e)(1) was written to address items covered by
the patent term extensions, the Court in Eli Lilly said that "Federal
law" in the statute referred to an entire act that regulates drugs. If
381d. at 863.
39 See Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
40 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
41 Id. at 667. See also 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4).42 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 667.
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that act also includes medical devices, then the use of those is also
protected under the provision.
43
The language in § 271(e)(1) also includes "new animal
drug[s] or veterinary biological products" in the experimental use
exception.44 The statute looks to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) for a definition of these terms.45 The
FDCA defines "new animal drug" as "any drug intended for use
for animals other than man, including any drug intended for use in
animal feed.""6 This legislation does not define "veterinary
biological products" separately, however. This leaves unanswered
the question of whether this was intended to apply to modified
animal feed or to animal feed modified exclusively by the addition
of new animal drugs. In addition to the codified experimental use
exception courts have also begun to focus on what the
experimental use exception excludes. The case of Embrex Inc. v.
Service Engineering Corp.47 is a good illustration of this point.
Embrex had received a patent under the Bayh-Dole Acte for a
4sId. at 666.
44 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2001).
45d.
46 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2001).47 See Embrex Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2000).4'35 U.S.C. § 200 (2001):
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent
system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from
federally supported research or development; to encourage
maximum participation of small business firms in federally
supported research and development efforts; to promote
collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit
organizations, including universities; to ensure that inventions
made by nonprofit organizations and small business firms are
used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise
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method of inoculating bird ova in the egg prior to hatching.
Service Engineering Corp. (SEC) then tried to secure Embrex's
permission to manufacture machines to do the inoculating.
Embrex, however, refused.49
After settling an initial dispute over SEC's attempt to
design around the Embrex patent, SEC continued in its efforts to
build a machine to inoculate ova. The SEC machine, however,
was designed to inoculate in a different area of the egg than that
described by the Embrex method. To determine the efficacy of its
revised method, SEC conducted tests to compare its inoculation to
that of Embrex. Embrex, once again, sued SEC for infringing its
patented inoculation method. 0 In their defense, SEC claimed that
its performance of the Embrex method was done to test the
effectiveness of their new method and, therefore, was not
infringing under the experimental use exception.51
The Federal Circuit commented that the experimental use
exception is construed "very narrowly." The Court pointed out
that the experimental use exception was construed very narrowly
in Roche and like the experiments in Roche, the experiments
performed by SEC had, "definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial
without unduly encumbering future research and discovery; to
promote the commercialization and public availability of
inventions made in the United States by United States industry
and labor; to ensure that the Government obtains sufficient
rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of
the Government and protect the public against nonuse or
unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize the costs of
administering policies in this area.49 Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1346.50 d.
51 Id. at 1349.
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commercial purposes." 52 Even though SEC claimed that its test of
the Embrex's method were merely scientific, the court found that,
although the tests were done, "in the guise of scientific inquiry,
that alone cannot immunize [its] acts. 53
Death of the Experimental Use Exception?
As with any legal doctrine, the experimental use exception
has been scrutinized and its usefulness has been questioned. This
section reviews and responds to some of the more well-voiced
criticisms the exception has received.
Some scholars believe that the experimental use exception
is actually contrary to the intentions of those who wrote patent law.
For example, Justice Randall R. Rader of the Federal Circuit said
that the experimental use exception cannot last because it looks to
the intent of the infringer for its application; intent, however, is
irrelevant when analyzing infringement.54 He points out that both
the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have found that intent is
of no consequence in determining infringement.55 Infringement is
analyzed without determining the purpose of the use. Therefore,
one cannot justify what would otherwise be an infringing activity
by calling it "experimental use." After all, the intent and purpose
analyses should not even be made.
However, Justice Rader seems to rely on cases in which,
though infringement was the question, the answer was found in
52 Id. See also Roche Products v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).53 Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1349.541d. at 1352. See also Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62
F.3d 1512, 1519 (Fed Cir. 1995).
51 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519.
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determining whether the defendant practiced the patented article. 56
It is important to recognize that this does not necessarily dictate
that the experimental use exception should not even exist. After
all, in the cases Justice Rader cites to support his overwhelming
generalization about the viability of the experimental use
exception, the articles made by the alleged patent infiingers were
either to be used or were used for commercial exploitation.
Such commercial exploitation does not always exist,
however. There are occasions when the use of a patented article is
for strict scientific inquiry or is used to determine its usefulness to
a particular process. These are the occasions in which the
experimental use exception has been upheld as a viable defense.
Justice Rader's lack of support of the exception (as described in
Embrex) simply does not address these scenarios and, therefore,
cannot be used to support abolishment of the exception in all cases.
Conclusion
Patent laws are in place to protect inventors from
unlicensed use of their inventions. Congress and the courts have
noticed, however, that some acts which would normally be deemed
infringing might deserve special treatment. It is for that reason that
they have permitted some uses of patented items to be recognized
as non-infringing through an experimental use exception. Usually,
to fall within this exception, the use has to be one that is not for a
commercial purpose and would not harm the patentee's interest in
the item. A use made to determine commercial applicability may
be acceptable if it would not lead to commercial gain for the user
and a lost interest for the patentee. Although this exception has
56 Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1349.
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been deemed a narrow one, it nevertheless seems that it is accepted
as a well-founded doctrine, even to the point of it being expanded
in the interpretation of its statutory limits. Though the common
law experimental use exception has been applied rather even-
handedly, perhaps the limits of the statutory doctrine could be
expanded further.
In § 271(e)(1), Congress seemed to expand the
experimental use exception to cover the use of items that, though
used commercially, were used to assess their medical benefits. At
the time, the emphasis on products with medical benefits may have
been appropriate. However, in today's agricultural market, in
which science holds many keys to feeding people efficiently, the
restrictions of § 271(e)(1) perhaps should be extended. Certainly
this is not to suggest that the reading of § 271(e)(1) is to be
broadened, but rather to suggest that some other legislation that
serves to open the § 271(e)(1) protections to biotechnology
products would be beneficial.
Perhaps Congress' drafting of § 271(e)(1) was influenced
by a once-present perception that only medical products benefit
mankind enough to be protected under the experimental use
exception. This is simply erroneous.
Arguably, many of today's technological revolutions like
biotechnology provide an equally, and perhaps greater, immediate
benefit to mankind. Perhaps now is the time to recognize the
importance of such vital industries and to encourage their growth
through protections similar to those offered by § 271 (e)(1).
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